

D  
R  
A  
F  
T

14 JUL 1980

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency  
Secretary of the Navy

SUBJECT : Soviet Naval Readiness (U)

1. I have reviewed the Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on "The Readiness of Soviet Naval Forces" <sup>which I requested be prepared</sup> and am aware of the controversy which preceded its publication. This document is a <sup>very</sup> valuable first step in

evaluating the quality and readiness of Soviet forces. This examination <sup>of the</sup> must be continued with <sup>even</sup> greater cooperation among the participants; & it must <sup>be extended to the other Soviet armed forces.</sup>

2. Specifically, I request that you insure senior level support to future interagency studies. In the naval readiness study, for example, some agencies reversed their positions at the last moment because of a lack of early top level participation. Ongoing studies of the readiness of Soviet forces cannot hope to succeed without your personal support.

<sup>Specifically, I request that the DCI & the Navy commence a</sup>  
3. I also ask that the Navy provide more benchline data to the <sup>intelligence community</sup> on US operations, such as unit availabilities, deployment rates, training, maintenance, and personnel statistics, & <sup>intensify collection of data on corresponding Soviet data.</sup> This information is essential if we are to make the comparisons which will lead to informed judgments concerning Soviet readiness and capabilities.)

4. <sup>model</sup> Additionally, basic research on the qualitative aspects of Soviet naval power is needed. We must know more about their recruiting, training, motivation, and command practices. This information, matched with a comprehensive assessment of their weapon systems, will provide a more complete picture.

SECRET

3. I further request that  
the DCI advise me & the  
Secretaries of the <sup>AN Force & Army</sup> ~~Services~~  
his view of areas for prospective  
studies of Soviet air & general  
force readiness

SECRET/NOFORN

- We could not obtain usable comparative availability data on equivalent US forces.
  - We could not get permission to make comparative statements about US forces (yet, DoD agencies continually argued that US Navy suffers similar deficiencies). This ban extended even to publicly known figures, such as US SSBN deployment rates.
  - DoD principals did not focus on paper until late in coordination process; characterized by "eleventh hour" reversals of position and intense behind-the-scenes lobbying for DoD unity by DIA and Naval Intelligence.
- D. Nevertheless, IIM breaks new analytical ground and is valuable first step to evaluate quality of Soviet Navy.
- E. Should continue examination of Soviet Naval Readiness; but with improved DoD, particularly Navy, participation. Specifically:
- Navy should provide comparative data on US operations, such as unit availability over specified time periods, deployment rates, training, maintenance, personnel statistics, etc.
  - Navy/NSA should commit collection resources for a concentrated examination of the training and exercise activity of individual combatants as they deploy out-of-area. With baseline data on a few specific units, we can extrapolate for force.
  - DoD should be more willing to concentrate its analytical efforts--early in the process--on interagency studies with high-level interest.

NOTE: Initial Navy cooperation on forthcoming IIM on Soviet Atlantic SLOC Interdiction is encouraging. I trust it will continue. DIA, on the other hand, is not supporting this effort seriously. ||

16 July 1980

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Secretary of Defense,  
14 July 1980 (U)

15. I delivered the IIM on Naval Readiness and went through the talking paper quite thoroughly. I revised the draft memo for Brown to send to his own people and a copy is in the Brown briefing book. Send it down to the staff. (C/NF)

*done  
by [unclear]*

Orig Cl By 169947

Rvw 15 July 2010